Unit 3 Essay Planning

• interconnecitivty ran rampant
  • Prussian suc- cess was due in large measure to the application of new technologies to logistics and warfare: the new breech-loading "needle gun" (which could be fired from the prone position) and the use of the railroad and the tele- graph to move and coordinate troops and supplies. - mason
  • he empi re was so widesp read that it was difficu lt for the power of the central government to radiate out throug h the provinces, even with the use of nineteenth· century technologies such as telegraphs and railroads. - gelvin
  • The telegraph rapidly became as conventional a presence in the nineteenth century as the cell phone is today. And like other nineteenth century inventions -s teamboats and railroads and the Gatling gun - the telegraph proved to be an indispensable tool of imperialism - gelvin
• britain embraced interconnectivity (embraced/made profit off of trade, had a strong navy)
  • For over a century before 1815, of course, the Royal Navy had usually been the largest in the world. - kennedy
  • Th.e first was the steady and then (after the 1840s) spectacular growthof an integrated global economy, which drew ever more re- gionsinto a transoceanic and transcontinental trading and financial networkcentered upon western Europe, and in particular upon Great Britain. - kennedy
  • The British compelled China to sign a one-hundred-year lease over Hong Kong, which became one of the most important commercial and trading centers in Asia. - mason
  • The European states initially relied primarily on chartered trading com- panies to explore and develop colonial areas, expecting that the resulting colonies would essentially pay for themselves. - mason
• japan 54! 57!
  • started as closed off
    • In 1853, the American Commodore Perry forced his way with a fleet of naval vessels into Yedo Bay. insisted upon landing, and demanded of the Japanese government that it en gage in commercial relations with the United States and other Western powers. In the next year the Japanese began to comply, and in 1867 an internal revolution took place, of which the most conspicuous consequence was a rapid westernizing of Japanese life and institu tions. But if it looked as if the country had been "opened" by Westerners, actually Japan had exploded from within. - palmer
    • For over two centuries Japan had followed a program of self-imposed isolation. No Japa nese was allowed to leave the islands or even to build a ship large enough to navigate the high seas. No foreigner, except for handfuls of Dutch and Chinese, was allowed to enter. Japan remained a sealed book to the West. - palmer
  • opened up
    • In the summer of 1898, Kang Youwei, a brilliant Confucian scholar who admired Japan for its rapid adoption of Western institutions and industrialization, - ropp
    • The lords of Choshu and Satsuma now concluded that the only way to deal with the West was to adopt the military and technical equipment of the West itself. - palmer
    • The Meiji era (1868-1912) was the great era of the westernization of Japan. Japan turned into a modern nation-state. - palmer
    • Foreign trade, almost literally zero in 1854, was valued at $200 million a year by the end of the century. - palmer
  • took stuff and became powerful
    • A navy, modeled on the British, followed somewhat later. - palmer
    • newly western,zecl army and navy, - palmer
    • The Russians sent their Baltic fleet around three continents to the Far East, but to the world's amazement the Rus sian fleet was met and destroyed at Tsushima Strait by the new and untested navy of Japan. - palmer
• china resisted interconnevtivity
  • here were Confucian officials in the late nineteenth century who called for "self-strengthening," learning from the West, and who began to build modern weapons, steamships, railroads and telegraph lines. But the Qing Empire was a vast, poor, mostly agricultural and overpopulated territory with a small, weak gov ernment, and the modernization efforts were confined to tiny coastal areas that had little impact inland. - ropp
  • In the summer of 1898, Kang Youwei, a brilliant Confucian scholar who admired Japan for its rapid adoption of Western institutions and industrialization,
  • liked japans industrialization (see above) then "ordered the reform movement crushed." - ropp
  • The Qing court remained largely ignorant of these processes. In the late eighteenth century, British traders came to feel increas- ingly frustrated with problems in the China trade. - ropp
  • Qing government saw inter national trade not as a way to generate new wealth but as a privilege granted to less-developed "barbarians" in exchange for their paying respects to the Son of Heaven and his court. British merchants were allowed to trade only at the southeastern seaport of.Guangzhou (known in the West as Canton), where they were confined to a few warehouses and allowed to reside only temporarily to load and unload their ships. - ropp
  • British mer chants would be expelled if they tried to come ashore anywhere other than Guangzhou and concluding with a standard emperor's command to his lowly subjects: "Tremblingly obey and show no negligence!"1 - ropp
  • China's ship of state had fallen into serious disrepair. “She may, perhaps, not sink outright; she may drift some time as a wreck, and will then be dashed to pieces on the shores; but she can never be rebuilt on the bottom - ropp
• china got fricked
  • In 1894-1895, fighting over influence in Korea, Japanese troops quickly and soundly defeated Qing forces. - ropp
  • In September 1899, John Hay, America's secretary of state, issued a series of "Open Door Notes" to Britain, France, Ger many, Russia, Italy, and Japan, calling on all foreign powers in China to allow free trade in all spheres of influence. - ropp
  • Great Britain sent an expedition ary force of sixteen warships, four armed steamers, twenty-seven transport ships, and one troop ship to China in 1840, with a total of 4,000 British troops. The Chinese had no naval forces capable of defeating such a force and little comprehension of how deadly serious the British government was in its determination to force the opium trade to continue and to grow. - ropp
• conclustion?
  • The moral was clear. Everywhere leaders of subjugated peoples con cluded, from the Japanese precedent, that they must bring Western science - palmer

The Industrial Revolution gave birth to a massively shrinking world. It brought the invention of railroads, steamboats, and the telegraph, which "rapidly became as conventional a presence in the nineteenth century as the cell phone is today" (Gelvin 80). These inventions allowed for the rapid travel of goods and information the likes of which had never been seen before. The Industrial Revolution led to a sort of co-revolution which continues to this day: the interconnectivity revolution. Interconnectivity, in this context, can be defined as the exchange of goods and ideas and the infrastructure facilitating this exchange. All of a sudden, the world was becoming massively interconnected, not only dramatically increasing the pool of ideas that any given state had access to, but exponentially increasing the ways these ideas could interact with one another. As a consequence, the 19th century was fraught with massive changes in power. The major factor that determined which side of the power shift a state would be on was its willingness to embrace interconnectivity.

Britain heavily embraced interconnectivity, leveraging it for power and profit. Trade, one of Britain's main sources of income, is one of the primary manifestations of interconnectivity. Britain heavily promoted trade, even leveraging its power to take territory from other states, creating "important commercial and trading centers" (Mason 98). They focused on developing a powerful navy, which became "the largest in the world" (Kennedy 152). This navy effectively served as an infrastructure for propagating interconnectivity, as seafaring was the primary means of transferring goods and ideas between states. They used this navy to enforce free trade and manage trade routes, further promoting interconnectivity and eventually leading to the "spectacular growth of an integrated global economy […] and financial network centered […] upon Great Britain" (Kennedy 143). Of course, Britain benefited massively off of this newly created integrated financial network, which, along with it's goods, would spread ideas. Expanding and rising in power immensely, Britain truly was one of the driving forces behind this interconnectivity revolution.

After centuries of isolation, Japan accepted the interconnectivity revolution and prospered because of it. During Japan's period of self isolation, "no Japanese was allowed to leave the islands or even to build a ship large enough to navigate the high seas. No foreigner […] was allowed to enter" (Palmer 543). Japan had little power, little influence, and was the antithesis of an interconnected state. This isolation continued until 1853, when "the American Commodore Perry forced his way with a fleet of naval vessels into Yedo Bay," initiating Japan into the interconnectivity revolution (Palmer 543). Commodore Perry demanded that the Japanese engage in trade with the Western powers, and "the Japanese began to comply […] in 1867 an internal revolution took place, of which the most conspicuous consequence was a rapid westernizing of Japanese life and institutions" (Palmer 543). In what is now called the Meiji era, spanning from 1868 to 1912, Japan experienced a complete shift from isolation to being the model of a modern state. Trade, "almost literally zero in 1854, was valued at $200 million a year by the end of the century" (Palmer 548). Japan embraced interconnectivity, exchanging and adopting ideas along with goods. This exchange led to a massive increase in Japan's power, and they formed a "newly westernized army and navy" which was "modeled on the British" (Palmer 547). This increase in power allowed Japan to defeat the Russians and the Chinese, much "to the world's amazement" (Palmer 654). Japan, beginning as the very opposite of an interconnected state, accepted interconnectivity, and rapidly gained the ideas and goods which ultimately led to a massive increase in their power.

China, starting with isolation similar to Japan's, resisted the interconnectivity revolution and suffered because of it. Initially, China resisted free trade. They saw trade itself as a sort of charity, a privilege "granted to less-developed 'barbarians' in exchange for their paying respects to the Son of Heaven and his court" (Ropp 102). They also heavily restricted trade, allowing it only in specific ports and confining traders to but "a few warehouses […] to reside only temporarily to load and unload their ships." (Ropp 102). This outlook on trade — and the policy that followed — led to the inevitable and increasing frustration of the British traders. Not only did China resist the exchange of goods, but they also resisted the exchange of ideas — two key components in interconnectivity. In 1898, "a brilliant Confucian scholar who admired Japan for its rapid adoption of Western institutions and industrialization" tried to do the same to China (Ropp 110). He issued a myriad of edicts, all based upon the idea of sending China through a "crash program of industrialization and Westernization" (Ropp 110). Conservatives grew alarmed, and the reform movement was easily and soundly crushed. Interconnectivity inherently brings with it a loss in autonomy and tradition, and China's unwillingness to sacrifice these led to it's downfall. Of course, Britain eventually released their navy upon China. Unlike the Japanese who embraced the interconnectivity revolution and built a powerful military, "the Chinese had no naval forces" and were almost instantly defeated (Ropp 105). The British mandated free trade by force, and China massively decreased in power. China was now an unwilling part of the interconnectivity revolution.

Not only does interconnectivity allows for broader access to ideas and goods, but it allows for new ideas to be created that would otherwise be impossible. The power of the interconnectivity revolution was greater than any state, and acceptance of this historical trend was required for success. The interconnectivity revolution has only continued, the world still shrinking day by day. In modern times — with the invention of the internet and such — it is much easier to see the value of interconnectivity, making refuting its importance almost futile. Sometimes we must sacrifice in the face of global trends

interconnectivity is more important and evident in modern day

Works Cited:

Palmer, R R, Joel Colton, and Lloyd S. Kramer. A History of the Modern World, 2000

Ropp, Paul Stanley. China in World History. Oxford University Press, 2012.

Mason, David. A Concise History of Modern Europe: Liberty, Equality, Solidarity. Plymouth, Rowman and Littlefield.

Kennedy, Paul M. 1988. The rise and fall of the great powers. New York, NY: Random House.

Gelvin, James L. 2011. The modern Middle East : a history. New York: : Oxford University Press.