Cold War Essay Planning Jack

New accounts push past a bifurcated world to present the Cold War as a triangular struggle between the two great powers and developing nations to show how those involved in decolonization struggles adapted strategies shaped by the Cold War dynamic.

Your task is to explore this triangular relationship within a single case study. Your task is to analyze how your sources suggest a way to capture this triangular cold war dynamic.

In a ~4 page paper, evaluate how a global perspective for the Cold War helps to understand events in your case study.

**How did the Cold War system shape development and/or decolonization in your region?

• "Beijing and Paris moved from military and political antagonism over the Indochina conflict in 1946-1954 and over the Algerian liberation struggle in 1954-1962 toward a partial alignment of views." AA
• "It was the shared uneasiness over the deteriorating situation in Vietnam and over the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in Moscow in early August 1963, that helped to usher in the process of recognition." AB
• A five point reason for establishment of relationships as argued by historian historian Garret Martin L1
  1. "First, the end of the Algerian War in the spring of 1962 removed a major point of Sino-French conflict." L1A
  2. "Second, the Cuban missile crisis in October ofthe same year revealed that neither superpower wanted global war. In turn, this provided new opportunities for medium powers to follow independent policies." L1B
  3. "Third, Sino-French recognition was a natural follow-up to de Gaulle's attempts to break Anglo-American dominance in the West in early 1963 through the Franco-German treaty." L1C
  4. "Fourth, de Gaulle perceived the LTBT of August 1963 as an attack on French global interests." L1D
  5. "Finally, the political instability in South Vietnam in 1963 brought China and France to agree in their criticism of Ngo Dinh Diem's regime." L1E
• "The shared nuclear isolation and the partial agreement on Vietnam in August 1963 by Beijing and Paris symbolized a new stage in the trajectory oftheir mutual relationship from antagonism toward mutual recognition" AC
• "From the day the PRC was founded in the fall of 1949, it had striven for universal diplomatic recognition. Not only did this policy express the old nationalist aim ofrestoring China to its former glory and greatness in international relations; it also conveyed the aspiration ofthe Communist leaders to obtain recognition from non-Communist states, based on the “principles of equality"” AD
• "The PRC explicitly warned the Soviet Union against assuming legal “responsibilities in lieu of China. Even now, decades after the signing of the LTBT, Chinese publications still claim that the treaty deprived the PRC ofthe right to develop and test nuclear weapons." AE
• "President John F. Kennedy, who feared the Chinese acquisition ofnuclear weapons in 1962-1963, was at times more interested in the proliferation aspects of the treaty than in the banning of testing in multiple environments" AF
• "De Gaulle was highly critical of the LTBT. In reality, however, France was not affected by the accord s provisions. The underground tests it was conducting in Algeria were permitted by the Soviet-British-American pact as the only way to test nuclear weapons. But the French president saw the trilateral agreement as yet another Yalta-style deal among the three most powerful countries on earth, concluded behind the backs ofless powerful states, and designed to preserve the three great powers' preeminent status in international relations" AE
• "Even if France and the PRC disagreed on the future course with regard to Vietnam, they both believed in the necessity of U.S. political and military withdrawal from the country" AF
• "The desire for recognition by the outside world also included the wish to join the UN and, as the ultimate goal, to take up the permanent seat ofthe ROC on the UN Security Council." AG
• "The PRC took pains to express its interest in better relations through some of its highest officials present at the Laos conference in Geneva." AH
• "The French ambassador had the strong impression that the PRC wanted to give the mutual relationship a “new importance." The Chinese had extended a hand, and they believed it was now up to the French to accept it.” AI
• "[Mao's] statement signified a departure from his earlier thinking on intermediate zones, which envisioned a Europe divided in halves belonging to either the socialist or the capitalist camp. But what did Maos new intermediate zone in Europe really mean? He claimed that the European countries were “unhappy with the U.S. and the Soviet Union." AJ
• "As the LTBT negotiations in Moscow drew to a close—the concurrent Sino-Soviet party-to-party talks in that city, which were intended to bring about ideological reconciliation, had already ended in failure" AK
• The French Foreign Ministry Asia Department Communique: "Asia Department ofthe French Foreign Ministry prepared a report in early February 1961 advocating rapprochement with Communist China—for reasons of principle and practicality." L2
  • "The Chinese Communists had held de facto power over mainland China for more than ten years. The notion that the ROC in Taiwan … was the legal representative of the Chinese people … had long before turned out to be a fiction." L2A
  • "Since the end of the Indochina War in 1954—and despite the Algerian war—France and the PRC … no longer had any reason to be antagonistic toward each other." L2B
  • "Because many newly independent French colonies in Africa were gravitating toward recognition ofmainland China, France had to appear to lead them in recognizing the PRC, otherwise it would lose influence in Africa." L2C
  • "Finally, Communist China had become the most important French trading partner in East Asia." L2D
• "He explicitly remarked that the LTBT did not prevent the PRC or France from continuing nuclear testing. Expecting an imminent Chinese nuclear test, de Gaulle elaborated that once China had obtained nuclear capacities it would become a major actor in international relations." AL
• "Zhou concluded that the Sino-Soviet split and the temporary U.S.-Soviet rapprochement on nuclear issues had created the basis for a major rearrangement in international relations, which would logically include Sino-French rapprochement." AM
• So why did Zhou decide this was a good idea? L3
  • They "believed that rapprochement with the most important European continental power, France, would progressively lead to increased political and economic relations with other West European countries, which in turn would break the U.S. economic blockade ofthe PRC while simultaneously increasing China's international status." L3A
  • "Sino-French rapprochement would be beneficial in isolating and opposing U.S. imperialism on a global scale." L3B
  • "Finally, China could align with France's policy of national independence designed to break the superpower monopoly in international relations." L3C
• "As de Gaulle saw it, France was willing to work for the admission ofthe PRC to the UN and to scale down French- Taiwanese relations to an informal level, but it was not willing to offer a French initiative to break relations with the ROC." AN
• "De Gaulle wanted both to proceed cautiously and to portray France as a great power unwilling to sub- mit to the dictates of any other country." AO
• "Zhou lauded France's decision to grant Algeria independence the year before and commented on the fact that both France and China, as aspiring nuclear powers, opposed the LTBT." AP
• "Zhou attempted to bring up the One-China principle, whereas Faure demanded the exclusion ofthe issue from this preliminary session." AQ
• "Faure insisted that de Gaulle would never take the initiative in breaking relations, so he suggested that France and the PRC simply exchange ambassadors, while the French govern- ment would downgrade the ROC representation in Paris to a level to be specified later." AR
• "The situation in Indochina had deteriorated further; the relations ofGreat Britain and the United States—France's two competitors for global influence—with the Southeast Asian countries had worsened in parallel."” AU
• "De Gaulle parted from Faure with the comment that he would go through with French recognition of the PRC if his conversations in Washington did not change U.S. views…. deGaulle's encounters with Johnson did not go well." AV
• "DeGaulle instructed deBeaumarchais … only"to define a procedure: /the simpler the better/”” AW
• "Zhou proposed a fourth procedure in case France was not able to agree to the One-China prin ciple. In that case, Li should state the Chinese position on the issue but not insist on the inclusion ofa sentence to that effect in any draft joint communique. … de Beaumarchais insisted that France would not agree to any reference to the One-China principle in the joint communique. Li, following the instructions he had received, dropped the issue" AX
• "if deBeaumarchais insisted on France maintaining a Two-China policy, Li was supposed to state clearly that such a position would mean a departure from earlier French positions and a sign ofdisrespect to the PRC, but Zhou's instructions did not call for a termination ofnegotiations in such a case" AY
• "De Gaulle's insistence on a simple text left the agreement vague with regard to the ROC on Taiwan." AZ
• So why did deGaull think this was such a good idea? L4
  • "He stated that China was the world's largest country, that it was no longer under the control ofthe Soviet Union, that its Communist government was a fact of life, and that all “political realities" of Asia” L4A
  • "Thus, he continued, it would be absolutely “impossible" to envision a solution to the problems ofEast Asia without China” L4B
  • "de Gaulle also stressed that recognition of the PRC entailed approval of neither its institutions nor its policies" L4C

*Cold war dynamics of the 1960s created a diplomatically timely opportunity for the development of Sino-French relationships for both states to assert their nationalism-fueled need for increased international recognition; to garner heightened recognition, both had to leverage diplomatic pragmatism in balancing their values with their realities to ultimately achieve their nationalistic goals of added recognition.*

Finally, define the results of the athour's focus on the sidelines of the Cold War. Engage with the projects of the author / their choices.

• Cold war create an opportuntity => /foregoround it with how the author is defining the cold war moment. The author is conciously decenter the cold war in order to compare China with France/
• Sino french leverage opportunity with pragmatic ways
• Nationalism as a end whilst value maintainnence as a means to that end
• The cold war created the ideal circumstance for sino-french collaboration
  • On the Chinese side, they saw the Cold War as an opportunity of growth and assertion of national identity admidst European chaos:
    • AM Zhou Enlai concluded that he Sino-Soviet split + US Soviet Nuclear Reapporachment — a product of the cold war — means that international BoP will change soon, so might as well build relations with France (connect CA)
    • AJ Mao departed from his earlier thinking of Europe in two a la cold war and moved to a European countries is unhappy with both US and Soviet stance (connect CA)
    • AE PRC did not want USSR to represent China wrt LTBT b/c of discontent; to this day PRC claim LTBT deprived them of nuclear development rights
  • On the French side, the combination of the the cuban missle crisis + LTBT gave the french a carrot and a stick to persue idependent dipolmacy from major European powers
    • The carrot: L1B cuban missle crisis showed that american/russia did not want to make world go kaboom, so medium states feel better to persue independent policies
    • The stick: AE The actualy LTBT doesen't really matter to the French, but its more about deGaulle not wanting to be the dog of British-American-Soviet relations
• Both countries reasoned the reconsiliation on practical grounds
  • The French reasoned the necessesity of Sino-French relationships based on the fact that China will be a major player at least in the East whether it liked it or not, so…
    • AL deGaull know that LTBT did not prevent PRC/France from trying Kaboom; so, expecting China to try blowing things up soon, deGaull reasoned that China will soon become a superpower once they could make things go Kaboom.
    • L4B deGaull reasoned that it would be impossible to solve the East Asia problem w/o China
    • L2C the French need to set an example in approaching China, otherwise china is going to approach the Indep. French colonies first, which would be awkward
  • The Chinese approached it from a need of international recognition, and potentially the advance of the 1 china policy.
    • AK the reconciliation between Moscow and Beijing did a die after LTBT negotiations in Moscow (connection BA)
    • L3A Zhou believed that reappoarchment with France will eveuntally cause US to stop blocading PRC + increase Chineses status
    • L3B Sino-French corroporation will oppose US + imperialism
    • L3C china could align with French's National Independence to break superpower monopoly
• Both parties approached the negotiations cautiously; but the Chinese were willing to give up ideological grounds for practical gain while the French guarded their ideologial bottom line
  • The French approached Sino-French relations cautiously, not wanting to give in too much, and AO portray France as a great, unwilling to submit power
  • L4C deGaulle also stressed that PRC recognition is not an approval of it policies/institutios
  • AX Zhou decided that if the French was really not up to the one-china thing in the comminque, it is ok to just drop it. the French was no ok, so they dropped it!
  • AY Zhou was even open to negotiatinos even if deBeaumarchais (deGaull + friends) wanted to maintain a Two-China policy